Loggon Sessions and Access Tokens
Last updated
Last updated
The key concept to grasp in order to understand authentication in Windows environments is the relationship between logon sessions and access tokens. A logon session is used to represent the presence of a user on a machine and begins when a user is successfully authenticated and ends when the user logs off.
For example, when a user physically logs on to a Windows workstation (i.e., interactively), they supply a username and password, which is then checked by the (LSA). If the account is a local account (i.e., only valid on that specific computer) the LSA will check the credentials against its own security database. In the case of a Windows Active Directory domain environment, the authentication attempt is referred to the closest domain controller (DC) which will process the request and authenticate the user. \
Once the user has been successfully authenticated, the LSA will create a new logon session and produce an access token, as shown above. A logon session can have multiple access tokens associated with it, but an access token can only ever be linked to one logon session (which is typically the successful logon attempt that generated it). Windows has legitimate functionality which can be used to change the logon session (and hence cached credentials) that your current token is associated with. Every new logon session is identifiable via a 64 bit locally unique identifier (LUID), referred to as the logon ID, and every access token must contain an Authentication Id (or AuthId) parameter that identifies the origin/linked logon session via this LUID. This is highlighted in the diagram below:
Every access token is linked to a sole logon session, which is identifiable via the AuthID parameter. The AuthID field contains a 64 bit LUID, or logon ID, which identifies the origin logon session.
you can check the access tokens of the currently logged in user with:
Typically, every process created by the user is a child of the shell process (i.e., explorer.exe) **** and every new process will (by default) run in the same security context as its parent; hence the child process will inherit its parent’s access token upon creation. Therefore, all processes will inherit their own local copy of an access token.
As stated previously, access tokens act as a local “volatile repository” for the security settings associated with the logon session. As each process has its own local copy of an access token, a process can modify the volatile security settings stored in its copy without affecting other processes.
When a local administrator logins, two access tokens are created: One with admin rights and other one with normal rights. By default, when this user executes a process the one with regular (non-administrator) rights is used. When this user tries to execute anything as administrator ("Run as Administrator" for example) the UAC will be used to ask for permission.
If you have valid credentials of any other user, you can create a new logon session with those credentials:
The access token has also a reference of the logon sessions inside the LSASS, this is useful if the process needs to access some objects of the network. You can launch a process that uses different credentials for accessing network services using:
This is useful if you have useful credentials to access objects in the network but those credentials aren't valid inside the current host as they are only going to be used in the network (in the current host your current user privileges will be used).
or using Process Explorer from Sysinternals (select process and access"Security" tab) The main function of an access token is to act as a “volatile repository for security settings associated with the logon session” which can be adjusted and modified on the fly. In this sense, access tokens act as a proxy or stand-in for the logon session and so when making security decisions, Windows developers never interact with the logon session itself (which is “hidden” away in lsass), but with an access token which represents it (and hence predominantly via the Windows access token API). Therefore, a developer can copy existing tokens (), modify the security settings for a given token (/) etc. to their heart's content, but these tokens are still just abstractions representing the security settings from the originating logon session. Most importantly, the access token represents the security context of the user. The security context can be defined as the privileges and permissions that a user has on a specific workstation (and across the network). An access token caches a number of which determine its security context, such as:\
• The security identifier (SID) for the user • Group memberships • Privileges held • A logon ID which references the origin logon session For example, the screenshot below shows the cached security attributes for an access token using James Forshaw’s :\
As discussed previously, the Authentication ID parameter, which is the key link between an access token and the logon session that it represents, contains a 64 bit LUID (logon ID) which identifies the origin logon session that this access token is associated with. Note also that it is possible to infer a number of other conclusions about the state of this token, e.g., it is a primary token, it is not elevated (medium integrity), and the user is an administrator ( = limited means the token is a ‘filtered’ admin token and hence UAC is enabled). Whenever a thread managed by the Windows kernel, such as a process, thread, handle, semaphore, token, etc., Windows will perform an . To perform this check, Windows needs three pieces of information2:
• Who is requesting access? • What are their intentions with the object? • Who can access the object? Hence, Windows will first check the token associated with the calling thread and look at the authorization attributes cached in it (e.g., user sid, group memberships, privileges etc.). Secondly, Windows will look at the desired requested by the thread. In the Windows security model you must state your intentions upfront; for performance reasons an access check only occurs once and no further checks are performed on any additional handle operations (unless a user attempts to perform an action that the handle did not have rights to, e.g., write to a read-only handle). Thirdly, Windows will retrieve the for the target object. The security descriptor contains a discretionary access control list () which specifies what users/groups have access to the object and the type of access granted. Based on these three sources of information, Windows can give a boolean answer to whether a principal has access to a given object. This is why every process must have a primary token; it is the user that is “charged” for any objects that process attempts to access.
As a note, some can be thought of as simply enabling a user to bypass/skip the access check in the kernel for a given object. For example, if a token has the privilege enabled, the Windows kernel will skip the DACL checks for any process and thread objects (hence why it is so powerful).
Following successful authentication from an interactive logon, Windows will execute the user’s shell (normally explorer.exe) on behalf of the newly logged-on user. The operating system performs this action by using the newly minted access token to spawn explorer.exe as that user via . This function takes a handle to a token and spawns a new process as the user specified in the token (i.e., in a different security context).
